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Abstract. Not every legal rule can and should be visualized. The limits of visualization are 
set by the substance of the legal rule in question and the characteristics of the addressee, 
including the context in which he or she encounters the visual representation of the rule. 
Too complex a visualization – and the very purpose of visualization is lost as it does not 
present an improvement over the original, textual expression of the rule. Too simple (or 
simplistic?) a visualization – and the substance of the legal rule may be reduced or modified 
to a point that it becomes misleading and prone to misdirect action. At a basic level, the 
visualization of legal rules must not understate or overstate the risks of non-compliance, it 
must adequately inform and guide behavior. Consequently, we must not only select the best 
method of visualizing a given rule but also select the rules that are the best candidates for 
visualization. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Despite the Latin maxim ignorantia juris non excusat (“ignorance of the 
law is not an excuse”), which implies that we cannot escape liability on the 
basis that we were not aware of the law, statutes and court judgements have 
never been drafted to be easily comprehensible by the average person. 
Even in the consumer context, laws, regulations and contracts are rarely 
written with intelligibility in mind – despite the fact that legal instruments 
often mandate the use of plain language.1 Somewhat illogically, we are 
supposed to know and follow rules that we cannot understand. Somewhat 
illogically, in practice, the primary addressees of legal rules seem to be 
lawyers and/or judges – those who enforce compliance, not those who must 
comply. Unfortunately, those who must comply often “discover” the 
applicable legal rule (or: develop a better understanding thereof) when it is 
too late: in the case of non-compliance. One can thus hardly disagree with 
the statement that “law can be made more comprehensible if it is made 
more visual.”2 At the same time, the broad and optimistic formulation of 
this statement masks the inherent constraints of visualizing legal rules. 
 
1.1 Aims 
 
This paper presents a high-level exploration of the natural constraints 
encountered by Visual Law. There are limits on what can be conveyed by 
means of visual representations - limits dictated by the substance of the 
legal rule and the addressee of the visualization. Law is word-based 
                                                
1 See e.g. Regulation 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (“GDPR”) Article 7 (2). 
2 http://www.openlawlab.com/project-topics/illustrated-law-visualizations 
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because, as a matter of principle, only words can convey the complexity of 
legal rules - a complexity that is increasing in parallel with (or in response 
to?) new commercial practices and social conventions. Historically, an 
actual familiarity with legal rules has been expected from the educated 
elite. It is only in the last hundred years or so that the ordinary man, 
including the average consumer, encounters legal rules on a daily basis 
and is supposed to understand them. The point is not that laws have not 
existed or that legal rules were not applicable to the average person. The 
point is that such person has never encountered such a multitude of 
complex legal rules directly affecting almost every daily activity with such 
frequency. Legal rules, be it in the form of traffic regulations or terms and 
conditions governing our access to online resources, have become 
pervasive. Until recently, we were not asked to read terms and conditions 
or express consent when consuming media content or entering buildings. 
Given that our activities are affected by more rules and that such rules 
seem to display an unprecedented intricacy, it becomes important to 
improve their “comprehensibility.”  Making the text of a statute or 
regulation available online is not sufficient. Neither is providing the text of 
the terms and conditions governing a transaction. Against such 
background, the role of Visual Law cannot be overestimated. At the same 
time the whole area remains vague, both in terms of research agenda and 
goal-setting. Exploring the constraints affecting the visualization of legal 
rules may thus assist us in determining the best applications of 
visualization in terms of actual impact and in delimiting the scope of this 
relatively new research area.3 Determining the limits of Visual Law, even 
provisorily, will enable us to better describe its aims and purposes. There 
is little point, after all, to set ambitious goals which cannot be met.  
 
1.2 Caveats 
 
For present purposes, we can describe Visual Law as the use of visual 
representations (“VR”) of legal rules (“LR”) to better convey or 
communicate the substance of such rules and/or to facilitate their 
understanding. Notably, the acronym VR includes the legal rule in 
question while the term “visualization” refers to the broad concept of 
representing information as a chart or image (i.e. otherwise than as pure 
text). It must be acknowledged that, with few exceptions and as a matter of 
principle, it is difficult to imagine the possibility of conveying legal rules 
exclusively by means of visualizations. The assumption is that in most 
instances the VR will include or be accompanied by some amount of text, 
however minimal. Ideally, the paragraphs in this paper should be printed in 
intermittently overlapping vertical columns. As the relationship between 
the individual constraints is not fully established, presenting them in the 
traditional linear sequence might be misleading. Moreover, my focus on 
the limits of Visual Law must not be interpreted as a critique of this 
burgeoning research area. Quite the opposite. My main point is that we 
need to refrain from generalizations and indiscriminate enthusiasm. 
                                                
3 C. R. Brunschwig, On Visual Law: Visual Legal Communication Practices and Their 
Scholarly Exploration (2014) Zeichen und Zauber des Rechts: Festschrift für F. Lachmayer, 
E. Schweihofer et al. (eds.), Bern: Editions Weblaw, 899-933), see also: M. E. Katsch, Law 
in a Digital World (Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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Arguments that are valid in one legal area, e.g. statutes pertaining to 
taxation, may be pointless in another, e.g. obligations deriving from 
contractual agreements. As demonstrated in the present and the previous 
issue of this journal, research should focus on the applications of 
visualization in specific legal areas. Visual law must be case-specific and 
goal-oriented, with particular emphasis on the characteristics of the 
addressee. The discussion in this paper could thus be accused of the very 
thing it seeks to criticize: making broad general, statements. This approach 
is, however, exclusively dictated by space constraints and by the fact that 
some broad assumptions are necessary – if only to assist in delineating the 
optimal applications of Visual Law. 
 
 
2. The Tenets of Visual Representation 
 
We must first address the very concept of a VR. Law is text and text is 
visual. Arguably, every LR already is visually represented. When speaking 
of “visualization” we must therefore mean something more or something 
different than pure text. Presenting a page with an excerpt of a statute or a 
passage from a legal case constitutes a visual representation of a LR. It 
does not, however, necessarily facilitate its better comprehension. By 
“something more or different” we can mean various things, depending on 
the proportion between text and/or graphics. On one end of the spectrum, 
the VR can retain a large part of the original text expressing the LR but the 
text can be arranged differently for better readability. An example would 
be the representation of statutes or individual provisions as flowcharts or 
algorithms. In such instance, the text forms an indispensable part of the 
visualization. On the other end of the spectrum, the VR does not contain 
any text and assumes a purely graphic form. In such instance, the original 
text of the LR remains hidden and the addressee only encounters its 
graphical derivative. An obvious example are street signs, which are 
graphical representations of LRs contained in traffic regulations.  As a side 
note: we could endlessly debate whether representations of LRs which 
retain all of the original legal text but only change its arrangement fall 
within the scope of Visual Law in the first place.  We must also 
acknowledge that the VR constitutes a derivative of the original, legal text 
establishing or describing the LR. Being a derivative, the VR always 
diverges from the original presentation of the LR to a greater or lesser 
extent. The overreaching research question will always concern the extent 
of such admissible divergence. Can the VR improve comprehensibility of 
legal rules if it overly reduces or simplifies their substance? To what extent 
does comprehensibility trump fidelity? 
 
2.1 Repeat or reduce? 
 
Repeating the text of the LR in the VR is often pointless, especially if the 
text is complex and abounds legal terms that are incomprehensible to non-
lawyers. The VR must be clear and comprehensible. It must not introduce 
further complexity into the situation. Its aim is, to repeat the obvious, to 
better communicate the LR and/or to facilitate its understanding. 
Theoretically, the VR must as closely as possible follow or represent the 
LR. The fundamental assumption of Visual Law should be that the VR 
must not mislead the addressee as to the substance of the LR or misdirect 
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the addressee’s behavior in a manner that could be detrimental to his or her 
interests. In such instance, the very purpose of visualization would be lost. 
There is hence an inevitable tension between providing too much 
information or adhering too closely to the original formulation of the LR 
and reducing the substance of the LR to a point where it ceases to fulfill its 
purpose. As the VR is always a simplified derivative of the original 
expression of the LR, it always carries the risk of misrepresenting the LR 
and hence misguiding the addressee. 
 
2.2 Permitted complexity 
 
If the VR is or has to be equally complex as the LR, we might have to 
resign ourselves to the fact that a given LR is inherently unsuitable for any 
other representation than its original textual expression. An example would 
be a VR taking the form of a decision tree or flowchart that replicates most 
of the legal text and, at the same time, presents a “visual spaghetti:” a 
confusing combination of graphical elements the relationship between 
which is difficult to decipher. If the LR itself is intricate, be it due to the 
complexity of the subject matter or due to bad drafting skills, then 
replicating its intricacy albeit in a different form seems inadvisable. These 
statements must, of course, be further clarified to avoid the impression that 
no VR is possible in such instance. Arguably, if the complexity of the LR 
prevents an adequate visualization, the VR need not fully represent the LR 
but “only” signal its existence and importance. In such instance, the VR 
would alert the addressee that legal advice is indispensable or that it is 
necessary to read the actual text of the LR. This is particularly the case 
when the LR in question can directly affect the legal and/or commercial 
situation of the addressee. The preceding statements leave open the 
question what constitutes an adequate visualization and whether – as 
implied above – the VR can be as complex as the LR itself or whether it 
should always simplify its substance.  
 
 
3. Selecting Information 
 
Visual Law is about better conveying legal information and must hence be 
distinguished from the mere act of providing information. It is, however, 
impossible to entirely disassociate Visual Law from the broader problems 
of furnishing information. The LR itself may prescribe the provision of 
certain information and this information may in turn contain individual 
LRs. Arguably, this is the case in all disclosure-based regulations. 
Moreover, Visual Law necessitates not only the selection of the optimal 
form of visualization in terms of technology (interactive website or static 
poster?) or manner of presentation (flowchart or algorithm?), but also the 
optimization (speak: minimization) of the amount of information to be 
visualized. Selecting what has to be visualized is antecedent to deciding 
how to visualize it. The selection process must allow for the empirically 
established fact that an abundance of information is generally 
disadvantageous and does not lead to better informed addressees or 
improved decision-making. 4 In fact, a “wealth of information creates a 
                                                
4 O. Ben-Shahar, More Than you wanted to know: the Failure of Mandated Disclosure 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2014).  
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poverty of attention.”5 The problem is aggravated by the fact that most 
addressees operate in complex information environments, which require 
more cognitive effort.6 The VR is hence rarely the only item competing for 
the attention of an addressee who is not only overwhelmed by the 
abundance of information, legal and otherwise, but also engaged in 
accomplishing his or her primary task, such as online shopping or content 
consumption.  
 
3.1 Challenges of disclosure 
 
Many legal instruments, especially consumer protection and privacy 
legislation as well as the some of the fundamental principles of contract 
law, rely on disclosure, i.e. the provision of information about the 
consequences of an action. For example, the GDPR requires (amongst 
others) a relatively detailed description of the purposes of data collection,7 
while contract law requires that the terms and conditions governing a 
particular transaction be made available before or at the time of contract 
formation.8 In practice, this often leads to situations where in order to 
comply with the law, the prescribed information is simply “dumped” on the 
addressee without regard to its comprehensibility or to the question 
whether the manner of its provision encourages the addressee to interact 
with it.  Disclosures made online are particularly challenging given the 
informational density of the online environment.9 We often intuitively 
assume that online technologies can improve the delivery and presentation 
of information. The relatively novel concept of so-called “smart 
disclosures,” which concerns the use of digital technologies to furnish the 
right information to the right customers at the right time10 and hence 
facilitate reading and understanding,11 may seem particularly attractive. 
Given that “smart disclosures” allow personalized delivery and make 
information more engaging, we would assume that legal information so 
delivered will, in fact, be more comprehensible and easier to engage with.12 
While many technologies, such as text boxes hovering over words are 
                                                
5 H. A. Simon, ‘Designing Organizations for an Information-Rich World’ in: Martin 
Greenberger, Computers, Communication, and the Public Interest, Baltimore. (The Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1971) 40–41. 
6 L. Rosenfeld, et al, Information Architecture, 4th Ed., (O’Reilly, Sevastopol, 2015) 15. 
7 Regulation 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data and repealing Directive 95/46/EC 
(General Data Protection Regulation) Article 7; Article 21. 
8 E. Peel, G.H. Treitel, Treitel on the Law of Contract (Sweet & Maxwell, 14th Ed, 2015) at 
para 7-007; Hood v Anchor Line (Henderson Bros) Ltd [1918] AC 837 (HL); Chapleton v 
Barry UDC [1940] 1 KB 532. 
9 Directive 2009/65/EC on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations and Administrative 
Provisions Relating to Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities 
(UCITS) [2009] OJ L 302/32, art 2(1)(m); the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission, Regulatory Guide 221, ‘Facilitating digital financial services disclosure;’ see 
also: O. Ben-Shahar, C. E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure (2011) 159 
University Pennsylvania Law Review 647, 684–90.  
10  J. Liles, ‘Enhancing SEC Disclosure with Interactive Data’ (2014) 91 Denver University 
Law Review Online 121, 125- 127. 
11 A. Godwin, ‘Brave New World: Digital Disclosure of Financial Products and Services’ 
(2016) 11 CMLJ 442. 
12 E. Rubin, ‘The Internet, Consumer Protection and Practical Knowledge’ in Jane Kaufman 
Winn ed., Consumer Protection in the Age of the Information Economy (Ashgate, Farnham 
2006); Ariel Porat, Lior Jacob Strahilevitz ‘Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with 
Big Data’ (2014) 112 Michigan Law Review 1418. 
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capable of highlighting or explaining specific information, they do not 
solve the problem of information overload, limited attention spans and alert 
fatigue. Similarly, making certain information unavoidable, as is the case 
with pop-up windows and (the incessantly annoying) online cookie 
notification bars, may force addressees to give it some attention but does 
not facilitate the comprehension of the LRs contained therein. 
Unsurprisingly, as a matter of principle and irrespective of the technology 
used, disclosure-based instruments have had limited success. In sum, 
making the VR visually appealing and interactive by means of online 
technologies need not be conducive to the comprehension of the LR. We 
must also remember that the aim should be to minimize the amount of 
information conveyed by the VR to what is absolutely indispensable to 
ensure comprehension.   
 
3.2 Mechanism of Delivery 
 
In using visualization to convey legal information we must also remember 
that the exact mechanism of delivery depends on the wording of the legal 
instrument or the formulation of the relevant LR. It may suffice to notify 
that information exists and make it available on demand. In other instances, 
specific information must be actually delivered or communicated. 
Information can be either pushed to or pulled by the addressee. The 
difference lies in the level of engagement expected from the latter. At 
times, the exact text must be provided, as is the case with the right to 
cancel a distance contract in the EU.13 In other instances, there is more 
leeway as to what wording to use and how to present it. Logically, if a 
legal instrument prescribes the specific text to be provided, there is less 
room for creative visualization techniques. In such cases, visualization may 
assist in improving the general layout of such text. We must also remember 
that even if many legal instruments prescribe that information be made 
easily accessible and provided in a clear and comprehensible manner, its 
sheer amount will always create challenges for virtually any visualization 
technique.   
 
 
4. Thou Shalt Not Nudge! 
 
Additional constraints concern the fact that a VR may be so effective as to 
directly encourage certain actions, especially if the LR presents an array of 
possible choices. It has been, after all, empirically established that the 
manner of presenting information (in terms of layout, sequence and even 
colors) can affect the selection made by addressees.14 Decisions can be 
influenced by manipulating the order of available alternatives, their 
attributes and the selection of defaults, amongst others. Thaler and Sunstein 
have famously defined a nudge as any aspect of design ‘that alters people’s 
behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or 
significantly changing their economic incentives.’15 Relying on findings in 
behavioral science and cognitive psychology, the theory behind nudges 
                                                
13 Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83 Article 9. 
14 N. Nahai, Webs of Influence (Pearson 2012) 72; St. Wendel, Designing for Behavior 
Change (O’Reilly, 2014). 
15 R. Thaler, C. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth And 
Happiness (Yale University Press, 2008) 6. 
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emphasizes that individuals often make inferior decisions concerning their 
own welfare—decisions that would change if they had complete 
information, unlimited cognitive abilities and strong willpower.16 
Consequently, as too many choices decrease decision-making capacity, it is 
often claimed that regulators are not only permitted but required to create 
decision environments that promote specific choices.17 Providing 
information to enable rational choices must, however, be distinguished 
from presenting information in a manner that encourages a specific 
choice.18 It remains controversial whether those who create VRs are 
allowed to take advantage of cognitive biases and nudge addressee towards 
specific actions. There might be a fine line between a visualization 
enabling better comprehension of or compliance with a LR and a 
visualization promoting a specific action, especially is such “promotion” 
entails a reinterpretation or distortion of the applicable legal rule. Those 
who create VRs, even if they act within a regulatory mandate (as would be 
the case with a consumer protection agency), must not present legal rules 
in a manner that clandestinely imposes their own values or exploit pre-
existing ambiguities in the law to achieve their own aims, however well-
intentioned.  We must also oppose the use of visualizations to nudge 
addressee towards specific actions – unless, of course, the nudge pertains 
to objective, binary choices, such as “do not enter” or clear statutory 
prescriptions, such as “lodge your tax return by the end of the financial 
year.” 
  
5. The Legal Rule to be Visualized 
 
The most significant constraints for visualization concern the legal rules to 
be visualized. We must therefore address the challenges of correctly 
delineating the content and scope of the LR. To improve 
comprehensibility, the VR must correctly present the substance of the LR. 
The accompanying difficulties largely depend on the source of the LR, 
which determines the “raw material” from which the LR is derived, as well 
as the permitted degree of simplification (speak: reductionism) of the rule 
in question. 
 
5.1 Extract and interpret 
 
At times, Visual Law scholarship seems to assume a somewhat formalistic 
and straightforward character of legal rules, underestimating the challenges 
of their adequate representation. It is, however, important to avoid a 
mechanistic, “cookbook” approach to visualization and to introduce some 
refinements. The process of “converting” a LR into a VR can be difficult 
and not every LR is susceptible to visualization. We can agree that a LR is 
a norm mandating or guiding conduct or action in a given type of 
situation.19  A technically perfect LR would be, amongst others, clearly and 
                                                
16 C. Sunstein, R Thaler, ‘Libertarian Paternalism is not an Oxymoron’ (2003) 70 University 
of Chicago Law Review 1159, 1167. 
17 See generally: E. Selinger, K. Whyte, ‘Is there a Right Way to Nudge? The Practice and 
Ethics of Choice Architecture’ (2011) 5/10 Sociology Compass 923–935. 
18 R. Baldwin, ‘From Regulation to Behavior Change: Giving Nudge the Third Degree’ 
(2014) 77 (6) Modern Law Review 831, 835 – 836; but see: P. G. Hansen, A. M. Jespersen, 
‘Nudge and the Manipulation of Choice’(2013) 1 European Journal of Risk Regulation 3. 
19 W. Twining, D. Miers, How to do Things with Rules, 5th ed., (Cambridge University 
Press, 2010) 80. 
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precisely expressed so that it would leave no room for doubt about its 
application in any possible case.20 Such perfect LR would, for example, 
prescribe that in circumstances X, behavior of type Y ought, or ought not 
to be, or may be, engaged in by persons of class Z. Clarity of expression 
would, logically, minimize the difficulties of interpretation and facilitate 
the conversion of the LR into a VR. For we must not forget that the 
creation of any VR always requires a conversion from one form into 
another and is preceded by an interpretation of the LR and, in many 
instances, its prior “extraction” from the relevant body of law. The 
complexity of this process demonstrates the level of competence expected 
from the person(s) attempting such conversion. As many LRs do not have a 
fixed, textual form, the “interpreter” of an LR must be an expert in the 
given field.21 Ideally, the entire process should be undertaken by a team of 
lawyers or regulators working  together with designers. 
 
5.2 From the general to the specific 
 
Stating the LR – or simply repeating the law - does not suffice to convey 
its meaning or facilitate its understanding: “bare statements of legal rules 
are generally not self-enacting, self-interpreting, self-applying, self-
invoking, self-enforcing or self-legitimating.”22 We must differentiate 
between presenting laws (or a particular law) and presenting rules that 
derive from such law. We must also assume that to understand a LR it is 
not sufficient to know its formal text. A mere repetition that contracts are 
formed by means of offer and acceptance is not only overly simplistic but 
also unlikely to assist the addressee in practice.  The same can be said of 
any VR that simply quotes or restates a statutory provision. It is only once 
we move from the abstract to the specific, from the provision of legal 
information in general to the communication of a LR in a particular 
situation or for specific purposes, that Visual Law can display its 
usefulness. In this context, we can tentatively suggest that while 
visualizations are unquestionably useful in communicating entire legal 
instruments their use seems more appropriate to the communication of 
individual legal rules, which are most relevant for a particular group of 
addressees. Assumedly, the narrower such group in terms of known 
attributes and/or the more specific the situation or legal problem at hand, 
the easier it is to adapt the VR to the needs of a particular scenario. In sum, 
visualizing the law in general is different from visualizing its individual 
rules in specific contexts. After all, most addressees are not interested in 
and need not know the law as such. They must only be informed of the LR 
that is relevant to them in a specific situation. VRs of the law in general are 
useful in educational contexts.  
 
5.3 Problems with the source 
 
We need to distinguish between the LR itself and its formulation. The latter 
is closely related to the source of the LR. Somewhat counterintuitively, the 
existence of a “confined set of words” expressing the LR can both assist 
                                                
20 H. L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd ed., (Oxford University Press, 1994) 127-8.  
21 Twining, Miers, above at note 19, 106. 
22 W. Twining, General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global Perspective 
(Cambridge University Press, 2009) 300. 
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and hinder visualization. On one hand, the absence of a definite and clear 
formulation of a LR creates the possibility of disagreement over its scope 
and substance. After all, before we select the optimal manner of 
visualization, we must first determine the “raw material,” the words 
expressing the LR. Challenges in interpreting an LR may be attributable to 
the fact that many rules have no fixed or “official formulation,” i.e. no 
standard or single accepted text expressing their substance. Such is the case 
with most LRs deriving from the common law of contract or the common 
law of tort. Lawyers and scholars from civil law jurisdictions frequently 
underestimate the difficulty of “reducing” the ratio decidendi of a case (or 
string of cases) establishing the LR into a more concise, civil law-style 
formulation.23 Many principles of contract law, to use a simple example, 
are not only “scattered” amongst multiple cases but also expressed in 
lengthy paragraphs of a descriptive nature. After all, students in common 
law jurisdictions are obliged to read dozens of cases to grasp the basics of 
contract or tort law. Consequently, conveying something as complex and 
abstract as, for example, the principles of contract formation or the doctrine 
of unilateral mistake, by means of a VR seems doomed from the outset. 
The solution to this conundrum – and a general guideline for the aims of 
visualization - is to abandon broad legal concepts and abstract principles 
and to consider the actual situation in which an addressee will encounter 
the VR. Much will depend on the purpose of the specific visualization, 
whether it serves to facilitate understanding or to guide actual behavior.  
 
We can suspect that individual, context-specific applications of a LR may 
be easier to visualize than abstract legal concepts. For example, instead of 
visually representing the aforementioned doctrinally complex process of 
contract formation, which rests upon the core concepts of “consideration” 
(something given in exchange for a promise) and “intention” (as 
objectively evaluated from the perspective of the reasonable addressee),24 it 
seems easier to visualize the mechanics of forming a specific contractual 
relationship, such as that between a telecommunications provider and its 
customer. In the latter instance, we need not worry about abstract legal 
principles but need to focus on their concrete application. It also seems 
easier to visualize specific rights and obligations, such as the duty to 
punctually pay the price or the ability to refuse the collection of personal 
information. It must be noted, however, that many legal doctrines such as 
the said doctrine of unilateral mistake in the common law of contract seems 
inherently unsuitable for any form of visualization – even when applied to 
specific circumstances. After all, how could we visually represent 
“knowledge of a mistake”? In sum, the absence of a clear formulation of a 
LR, its vague scope, reliance on broad concepts and complexity always act 
as natural constraints for visualization.  If the LR has a fixed textual from, 
such as a statute or regulation, then it provides a definite and “official” text 
as a starting point for subsequent visualization. The mere existence of such 
text generally removes a lot of uncertainty concerning the substance of the 
LR.25 In such instance, the challenges concern the meaning of specific 
                                                
23 See generally: L. Bennet Moses, ‘Recurring Dilemmas: The Law's Race To Keep Up 
With Technological Change’ (2007) University of Illinois Journal Law, Technology & 
Policy 239. 
24 M. Furmston, Cheshire, Fifoot & Furmston’s Law of Contract, 16th ed.,  (Oxford 
University Press, 2012) 41. 
25 Twining, Miers, above at note 18, at 96. 
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words used to formulate the LR as well as the interrelationship between the 
LR and other rules. Unfortunately, as with caselaw, the substance of one 
LR often derives from multiple statutory provisions or can even be co-
defined by other statutes. It is rarely the case that a single statutory 
provision translates into a LR or defines its entire scope. To complicate 
matters, if a LR is expressed in a fixed and authoritative textual form, such 
as a statute, interpreters are not free to change its wording. After all, a 
cardinal maxim of statutory interpretation is that statutes should not be 
paraphrased or “reformulated.”26 When interpreting a statutory provision 
for the purposes of visualization, there is always a risk of misrepresenting 
the substance of the LR. 
 
5.4 Breaking down the rules 
 
Irrespective of their source and formulation, many LRs are complicated, 
filled with exceptions, qualifications, provisos and double negatives. The 
relationship between various parts of the rule may be unclear. One way of 
addressing the resulting challenges is to abandon the typical legal narrative 
and to break down the rule into a sequence of statements and sub-
statements, each of which contains a single proposition drawn from the 
rule.27 Such “comminution” can result in a  checklist of the conditions 
under which the LR operates. Similarly, sections of statutes can be 
presented as flowcharts, maps or algorithms that visualize the steps to be 
taken to establish e.g. eligibility for statutory benefits or tax liability. An 
example is section 23 of the UK Income Tax Act 2007, which provides 
clear instructions for taxpayers to determine their income tax liability. 
Another visual device are algorithms, which usually take the form of 
structured questions capable of binary ‘yes’ and ‘no’ answers that confine 
addressees to those parts of the statute that are relevant.  Algorithms, 
flowcharts or maps cannot, however, resolve doubts as to the scope of a LR 
or the interpretation of words contained therein. If the addressee does not 
know the meaning of ‘constitutional right’ or ‘statutory liability’ 
converting the LR into an algorithm or flowchart is of limited assistance. 
Algorithms may also prove less useful when applied to lengthy rules or to 
isolated sections from statutes. Statutory rules are normally part of a wider 
range of provisions and must be read in light of them.28 The visualization 
of a single LR outside of its broader context creates the risk of 
misunderstandings.  Consequently, VRs often require supplementation 
from more exhaustive sources. Ideally, the actual text of the LR, the 
relevant statute, regulation or case should be easily accessible and written 
in a clear and legible manner.  
 
 
6. Addressee and Context 
 
As indicated, laws have never been written with the aim of being easy to 
read and understand. Consequently, the very aim of Visual Law should be 
to make the LR more accessible to the average person.  The optimal choice 
                                                
26 see Lord Neuberger in R (on the application of M) v Slough Borough Council [2008] 
UKHL 52, at 831. 
27 F. Bennion, Bennion on Statutory Interpretation 5th ed. (Lexis-Nexis Butterworth, 2008) 
section 139.  
28 Twining, Miers, above at note 19, 38. 
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of visualization techniques (algorithm or flowchart? amount of text to be 
retained? etc) depends on the addressee, the “end user” of the VR, who will 
encounter it in different contexts. Here, the difference between 
visualizations for educational purposes and visualizations aimed at 
providing actual advice or legal self-help becomes crucial.  On one end of 
the spectrum, we have law students who use the VR in their studies to 
better understand the LR or the complex relationships between different 
LRs within a legal area. In such instance, the VR is not expected to directly 
guide the addressee’s behavior only to facilitate learning. An inadequate 
VR may lead to a bad grade but not to a detrimental change in the 
addressee’s legal position. The law student can also be expected to better 
understand lengthy text and legal concepts as well as to consult other 
resources, including textbooks or lectures. Logically, this allows the VR to 
remain closer to the original formulation of the LR and creates fewer, if 
any, constraints when it comes to replicating the text of the LR. In the law 
student example, the VR may improve the representation of the logical 
structure of the LR or an entire legal area. We can also assume a longer 
attention span on the side of the addressee. On the other end of the 
spectrum, most addressees are not law students, have moderate literacy, 
operate under time constraints and cannot be expected to undertake any 
further investigation of the LR. More importantly, they may fully rely on 
the VR to guide their behavior. In the latter instance, non-compliance with 
the LR may also lead to immediate, disastrous results. We can think of 
drivers encountering stop signs or tenants from disadvantaged backgrounds 
finding eviction notices pinned to their doors. The driver ignoring the sign 
will crash the car, the tenant will be facing (nearly) immediate eviction. In 
such instances, we must also assume short attention spans and the inability 
to seek further guidance as to the substance of the LR. Along the spectrum 
we can think of architects and building codes, consumers and standard 
terms of sale, criminal offenders and court procedures, website users and 
privacy policies. We must also allow for broad motivational factors. VR 
may be encountered in a preventive context, where the addressee inquires 
about a legal issue to avert a problem, as well as in a reactive context, 
where the addressee has already encountered a legal problem that requires 
resolution. The addressee’s motivation to follow the LR in the second 
situation is incomparably stronger. Arguably, the closer the VR is 
presented to the decision, the more likely it is to steer the actions of its 
addressee, the higher its potential impact on actual behavior.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
While the field of Visual Law holds the promise of better conveying legal 
rules, we must remain aware of the practical constraints that will define the 
strength of this promise. The points made in this paper are simple. Not 
every LR is a candidate for visualization. The limits of visualization are set 
by the substance of the LR and the characteristics of the addressee, 
including the context in which he or she encounters the VR. Too complex a 
visualization – and the purpose of visualization is lost as the VR does not 
present an improvement over the original, textual expression of the LR. 
Too simple (or simplistic?) a visualization – and the substance of the LR 
may be reduced or modified to a point that it may mislead the addressee. 
At a basic level, the VR must not understate or overstate the risks of non-
compliance with the LR. Consequently, we must not only select the best 
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method of visualizing a given rule but also select the rules that are the best 
candidates for visualization. Many legal rules or concepts are inherently 
and intentionally vague. Visualizing them may inadvertently misrepresent 
their clarity and scope. When a LR is particularly complex and when the 
risks of non-compliance are particularly grave, it is advisable to use 
visualization to create impactful alerts concerning the existence of the rule 
– and direct the addressee to seek legal advice.  The main research question 
might concern the extent, if any, to which a VR can diverge from the LR in 
form and substance to remain useful in achieving the goals of Visual Law. 
On a more practical level, this would imply the necessity to empirically test 
individual visualizations in terms of their effectiveness, the latter being 
defined as the degree to which a given VR facilitates actual comprehension 
and/or the ability to guide the actions of the addressee. Of course, as 
indicated above, it is difficult to generalize as different forms of VR may 
prove to be more effective in different context.  
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